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Protecting Mutual Funds
from Market-Timing Profiteers:
Forward Pricing International Fund Shares
DAVID WARD*
INTRODUCTION
It has been the worst crisis in the eighty-year history of the mutual
fund industry. Beginning with a probe by New York Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer, investigators and securities regulators have uncovered
widespread improprieties in the $7.5 trillion mutual fund business. In
case after case, hedge fund managers, brokers and mutual fund
executives conspired to allow favored investors to rapidly trade in and
out of mutual funds, taking advantage of pricing inefficiencies to reap
hundreds of millions of dollars in profits at the expense of long-term
shareholders.'
Spitzer uncovered two types of abuses, both related to the way
mutual funds price their shares, practices known as late trading and
market timing. Mutual fund share prices, unlike shares of stocks and
bonds, are calculated once a day, usually at 4:00 p.m. eastern standard
time, when the stock market where the shares that mutual funds hold are
generally traded. All of the stocks, bonds and other securities held by the
fund are valued based on their price at that time.
First, Spitzer discovered that the mutual funds were allowing hedge
fund and other sophisticated investors to place buy and sell orders for
mutual fund shares after the 4:00 p.m. closing time, but allowing their
purchase price to be based on the closing price at 4:00 p.m., a practice
known as "late trading" that is barred by the Securities and Exchange
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005. The author is a
former financial reporter at Bloomberg News.
i. See Aaron Pressman & Matthew Keenan, U.S. Mutual Fund Investigation Extends Into
Seventh Month, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 3, 2004.
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Commission.' Second, mutual fund managers were allowing sophisticated
traders to rapidly buy and sell shares of mutual funds that held thinly-
traded securities (shares of stock that do not trade every day) or
securities that traded on markets in Asia and Europe, in an effort to
exploit changes in the stock's value because of an underlying event, one
that occurred before the shares were purchased by the funds but would
not be reflected in the funds' share price until later that day-a practice
known as "market timing. '
Market timing works like this: mutual funds calculate the price of
international securities or thinly-traded securities they hold at the last
price at which they were traded, a price that is often hours old. Funds
that hold shares of stock traded in Europe or Asia use the last available
closing price, which is generally calculated when those markets have
closed earlier in the day - I I:3o a.m. eastern standard time generally for
European markets and 2:oo a.m. eastern standard time the previous
evening for shares traded on Asian exchanges.4 These opportunistic
traders, (generally professional traders employed by hedge funds or
brokerages) aided by complicit brokers and fund managers, would buy or
sell shares during U.S. market trading hours after an event that occurred
after the European or Asian markets had closed that could be expected
to influence the price of those shares when they began trading again later
that night in Asia or early the following morning in Europe.' By doing so,
these traders could buy shares knowing they would rise, guaranteeing
themselves a profit. The practice is not specifically barred by the SEC,
but many mutual fund boards bar the practice, and indictments by
Spitzer and the SEC allege that the practice is fraudulent and violates the
funds' fiduciary duties to shareholders because the practice can cost the
6funds some profits, harming all the funds' other shareholders.
This Note focuses on the issue of market timing. It examines current
SEC efforts to curtail the practice, and concludes that the threat of
prosecution may go far to curtail the most blatant abuses. However, this
Note concludes that the new regulatory proposals do not sufficiently
eliminate the potential for exploitive traders to market time mutual
funds. This Note proposes that mutual funds holding shares of non-U.S.
companies can change their share-price calculations in a way that will
eliminate the ability of traders to market time those funds. PART I
describes the current scandal, the extent to which it has spread
2. See Complaint 11 15-18, State v. Canary Capital Partners, L.L.C. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (No.
402830/03).
3. See id. 9-11,22-35.
4. See id. T 23.
5. See id.
6. Id. 91 30; see also In re Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., Nos. 2205, 26312, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2997
(Dec. I8, 2003).
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throughout the financial services industry, and the initial responses by
Congress, investors and the SEC. Part II describes the history of market
timing and the development of SEC rules designed to address earlier
instances of market timing abuses. It demonstrates how those efforts
repeatedly failed to curtail the growth of market timing abuses
throughout the 199os. This section also explains the development of the
SEC's primary regulatory response to market timing-"fair value
pricing" policies designed to encourage mutual funds to estimate a fair
value for shares held in their mutual funds during instances when
dramatic price moves in United States or overseas markets would make
their traditional exchange-traded prices "stale" and therefore inaccurate
and subject to market timing abuses. Part III surveys the academic
analysis of the problems of market timing, documenting the extent of the
problem, particularly the growth in market timing abuses in mutual funds
that hold international shares. This section then reviews the academic
estimates of the cost to long-term shareholders. This section also
discusses the academic critiques of fair value pricing mechanisms. Part IV
describes new rules proposed and enacted by the SEC in 2004 in an effort
to stop the current abuses, specifically the Commission's emphasis on
forcing mutual funds to develop and disclose their fair value pricing
policies. Then, drawing on the academic research in this area, this Note
demonstrates how these policies, just as the past efforts by the
Commission, do not eliminate the regulatory structure of the mutual
fund industry that allowed market timing in the first place. Part V
outlines a partial solution to the problem, arguing that mutual funds
holding international equity securities can easily and fairly eliminate the
ability to market time those funds. This Note will argue that mutual
funds should abandon the expensive and often inaccurate efforts to fair-
price shares of securities traded on overseas markets, and should instead
implement a forward pricing rule that calculates the value of those shares
only after the mutual fund investor has bought or sold shares in the fund.
While acknowledging that this proposal is not appropriate for all mutual
funds, would increase the management costs of pricing the funds, and
could delay the ability of investors to receive their investment funds once
they have sold shares by up to twenty-four hours, this Note nonetheless
argues that the benefits of this proposal to investors far outweigh its
costs, and coupled with other measures the SEC has proposed in the
wake of the current crisis, could go far to curtail future market timing
abuses in the mutual fund industry.
I. CORRUPTION IN THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY
A. A SCANDAL EXPOSED
This scandal began with a whistleblower. In June 2003, former Wall
Street executive Noreen Harrington telephoned the office of New York
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HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and informed Spitzer and his staff of
widespread improprieties in the $7.5 trillion mutual fund industry.'
Specifically, she told Spitzer that managers at hedge fund Canary Capital
Partners LLC, where Harrington had worked, were using improper and
illegal trading strategies to profit from the rapid buying and selling of
mutual fund shares." In doing so, these managers reaped tens of millions
of dollars in profits at the expense of long-term shareholders.' Spitzer's
subsequent investigation into the practices led to an announcement on
September 3, 2003, that his office had reached a $40 million civil
settlement with Canary Capital and its managing principal Edward Stern,
a scion of one of the richest families in the United States.
I. Late Trading Mutual Funds
The indictment accused Stern of two types of improper trading in
mutual funds. Spitzer claimed that Stern and the Canary hedge funds had
been engaged in "late trading" mutual fund shares for at least the last
four years, an illegal practice in which Canary, with the agreement and
complicity of mutual fund management companies and their executives,
placed orders to buy mutual fund shares after the market had closed and
the funds had set their prices for that day." By doing so, Canary would be
able to take advantage of activity that occurred between the time the
market closed and the closing price for the shares was posted, and the
time the funds or traders purchased the shares, activity that would be
expected to affect the prices of the underlying shares of stocks, bonds or
other financial instruments that the mutual fund held. 2
Mutual funds hold stocks, bonds and other financial instruments and
price their fund shares once a day, at 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time,
based on the price at that time of those financial instruments. (The
closing price is known as the fund's NAV, or Net Asset Valuation).'3
Often, events occur shortly after 4:00 p.m. that will cause the prices of
those shares to rise or fall. For 'example, a company may announce its
quarterly earnings, and if they are better than expected, the stock would
presumably rise the next day.'4 Canary's arrangement with its banks
allowed the fund to place orders to buy or sell mutual fund shares after
7. Marcia Vickers, Dynasty in Distress, Bus. WK., Feb. 9, 2004, at 62, 68; see also Christine
Dugas, Spotlight Hits Whistleblower, USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 2003, Ei.
8. Vickers, supra note 7, at 67-68.
9. See Complaint 8, State v. Canary Capital Partners, L.L.C. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (No.
402830/03).
io. Vickers, supra note 7, at 64.
iI. Complaint J 9, 15-21, Canary (No. 40283o/o3).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Many publicly-traded U.S. companies release their quarterly earnings reports shortly after the
end of U.S. market trading. See, e.g., MIcROsOFT INVESTOR RELATIONS, EARNINGS RELEASES, at
http://www.microsoft.com/msft/earn.mspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
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the 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time closing price. 5 In effect, Canary was
purchasing shares in which market-moving events had occurred, but were
not yet reflected in the price used to calculate the mutual fund's NAV.6
Canary expected the stock price to rise the next day when it began
trading on U.S. financial markets; when the market closed that following
day and the mutual fund next calculated its NAV, Canary could expect to
see the value of the fund's shares rise.' Spitzer likened the practice to
"betting today on yesterday's horse races."' The Securities and
Exchange Commission outlawed late trading in 1968 when it adopted
"forward pricing rules" to the 1940 Investment Company Act. The Act
requires funds to set the price for the shares investors had purchased
after they had bought the shares-generally using the closing price for
the stocks that were set at the end of that trading day. 9
2. Market Timing Abuses
Canary also agreed to settle allegations that it had engaged in a
related practice known as "market timing," purchasing shares of mutual
funds that held shares whose prices were set hours earlier-"stale prices"
in the vernacular of the trade. For example, if a mutual fund holds
shares of a stock that trade in Tokyo or Hong Kong, the fund uses the
last closing price of those shares, as posted on those markets, when the
fund calculates its NAV at 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time.' Markets in
Tokyo and Hong Kong, however, close fourteen hours earlier, at 2:00
a.m. eastern standard time. And that time difference can create problems
in accurately calculating the correct share price because economic,
political or market-moving events could occur while trading was
underway in the U.S.-but after the markets in Europe or Asia on which
those shares traded had closed-that could reasonably be expected to
cause those stocks to rise or fall when they began trading on their
markets later in the day.
For example, say the U.S. government unexpectedly announces at
2:00 p.m. eastern standard time that it is eliminating the taxes charged
Japanese automakers to import cars into the U.S. This could cause the
price of shares in Japanese car makers to rise when those markets
opened later that evening in Tokyo and Hong Kong because the lower
tariffs would make it less expensive to import cars into the United States.
However, at 4:o0 p.m. when mutual funds set their daily prices, they will
15. Complaint 48, Canary (No. 402830/03).
I6. Id. 15.
17. Id.
i8. Id. 9 io.
19. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-I(a) (2004).
20. Complaint 23, Canary (No. 403830/03); Vickers, supra note 7, at 65.
21. See Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies, [1937-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,140 (Dec. 23, 1970).
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base those prices on the prices of Asian stocks that were set fourteen
hours earlier, when those markets previously closed and before the
shares could reflect the positive tax news. Therefore if a trader knew the
stocks would rise later that evening, he could buy shares in a U.S. mutual
fund that held Asian stocks. That evening those Asian stocks would rise.
The next day, when the mutual fund again calculated its prices, the
mutual fund shares would be worth more because the Asian stocks it
held had risen in value. Then, the day after that, the trader could sell his
shares for a profit. That is market timing.
The SEC does not specifically bar market timing. The commission
instead requires mutual funds to use either the last available exchange-
traded price (generally the closing price on the exchange where the
shares trade), and if that price is not available or is not accurate, the SEC
requires that mutual funds use their best efforts to calculate their NAV
based on a "fair value" of the underlying shares at the time it prices its
shares.2 Many mutual fund prospectuses, however, disallow the use of
market timing in their funds. They have established limits on the number
of trades in and out of a fund each month, or enacted trading fees
designed to eliminate market timing profits, or the funds simply bar
investments from those who trade too frequently in and out of its funds. 3
The harm to long-term shareholders that Spitzer has uncovered is
not insignificant. The problem with market timing and late trading is that
it dilutes the profits of long-term shareholders. 4 Market timing requires
funds to keep more of their money in cash to pay the short-term market
timers when they sell their shares, reducing the amount they can invest,
and thus reducing the profits for all shareholders. 5 Further, short-term
traders reap profits that should be spread out proportionately among all
investors; by selling their shares rapidly, short-term market timers reap a
larger portion of the return than long-term investors.26 The losses to
shareholders are estimated at billions of dollars a year. A recent
academic study estimated that market timing abuses alone cost long-term
shareholders $4.9 billion in a single year." According to Spitzer's
indictments, Canary alone allegedly reaped tens of millions of dollars in
profits from its trading activities, which Spitzer alleged occurred from
1998 until Canary received its first subpoenas from the Attorney
22. Id.
23. See Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Mgmt., the Budget, and Int'l Sec., Comm. on Governmental Affairs, io8th Cong.
196-97 (2003) (statement of Matthew P. Fink, President, Investment Company Institute).
24. Complaint 9I 25-27, Canary (No. 402830/03).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds, i9 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 245, 260 (2003).
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General's office in the summer of 2003.25 And this was just the tip of the
iceberg. As Spitzer, the SEC and other state regulators would soon
discover, Canary was not alone in its abuses of the mutual fund industry.
Spitzer's subsequent investigation uncovered that the hedge funds
(investment funds that cater to wealthy individuals and institutions and
are only lightly regulated by the SEC) were abetted by executives at
banks, brokerage firms, trading administration firms-and those within
the mutual funds themselves.
B. ABUSES ARE WIDESPREAD
Hedge funds such as Canary Capital could not operate alone. Their
trading strategies required the complicity of a number of players. First,
the funds needed brokers and brokerage firms that conducted the actual
trades. Second, they needed the firms that processed the daily trading of
mutual fund shares. And third, they needed the complicity of the mutual
funds themselves, which would have to turn a blind eye to the rapid
trading that, as Spitzer demonstrated, was occurring with frightening
regularity right before their eyes.
Shortly after the Canary indictments, Spitzer announced felony
charges against Bank of America executive Theodore Sihpol III, a
private client account manager. 9 According to Spitzer's allegations,
Sihpol and Bank of America executives allowed Canary to trade in and
out of the mutual funds it managed in return for commitments from
Canary to deposit millions of dollars in separate funds managed by Bank
of America." This alleged agreement reportedly benefited Bank of
America, whose divisions profited from their relationship with Canary
and the deposits he made in their funds."
Spitzer's discoveries set off a firestorm within the mutual fund
industry and among the state and federal regulators who were charged
with oversight of the industry. Within weeks, the SEC, along with state
securities regulators in Massachusetts, undertook similar investigations,
and mutual funds around the country began to conduct their own
internal investigations. The problems were widespread. In the past year,
Spitzer, state regulators or the SEC have indicted six mutual fund or
brokerage officials, settled civil complaints with at least forty more, and
have assessed more than $2.5 billion in fines, penalties and restitution.3"
Massachusetts securities regulators, under the leadership of Attorney
General William Galvin, have filed administrative complaints against
28. Complaint 1 35, 76, Canary (No. 4o2830/03).
29. Complaint, State v. Sihpol III (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2003), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/pressl
2003/sep/sihpol-complaint.pdf.
30. Complaint 50, Canary (No. 402830/03).
31. Id.
32. Brooke Masters, A Year of Charges, Reforms for Funds: Regulators Imposed Fines, Crafted
New Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2004, at El.
February 20051
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
companies, including Putnam Investment Management Inc., the second-
largest mutual fund company in the state, and one of the ten largest in
the United States.3 In addition to the alleged misdeeds at mutual funds,
regulators discovered that executives at brokerage firms had been paid to
help hedge funds disguise their identities when trading in and out of
mutual funds, particularly after the mutual funds had discovered the
market timing activities and attempted to bar the hedge funds from this
type of trading. 4
Adding to the group of individuals and companies that were
allegedly complicit in the improper trading techniques, regulators
discovered that executives at Security Trust Co., a Phoenix, Arizona-
based company that processed mutual fund trades for participants in
retirement plans, were submitting hundreds of late trades and market
timing trades on behalf of the Canary Capital hedge funds. The SEC
brought civil fraud charges against three executives at Security Trust,
Spitzer brought criminal larceny charges against the three, while at the
same time the Office of the Comptroller ordered the company shut
down. 5
By the end of 2004, many of the targeted firms had reached
settlements with the SEC and Spitzer. Bank of America and Fleet
Boston Financial Corp., whose Columbia funds had been targeted by
regulators for allowing improper trading in its funds, agreed to pay a
combined $675 million to settle the allegations, the largest fine extracted
from the investigation. 6 Overall, securities regulators have secured more
than $2.5 billion in fines, penalties and restitution from mutual funds and
other financial services firms targeted in the probe, and more than eighty
executives have resigned or been fired. 7
From the indictments and administrative complaints emerged
disturbing patterns of improper collaboration between hedge fund
managers, the brokers that promoted and sold mutual funds (mainly to
small individual investors), and the mutual fund managers themselves. In
case after case, the mutual funds had established explicit rules against
market timing. Yet time and time again, fund managers and bank
executives put their personal and professional interests ahead of those of
their customers and shareholders by allowing hedge funds to market time
their funds, rapidly buying and selling shares to reap short-term profits at
the expense of long-term shareholders.
33. Id.
34. See S.E.C. v. Druffner, No. 18,444, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2651, at *i (Nov. 4, 2003).
35. S.E.C. v. Sec. Trust Co., No. 18,479, 2003 SEC LEXIS 28oi, at *i (Nov. 25, 2003). See also
Patrick McGeehan, Mutual Funds Report: A Scandal, but Business Booms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004,
at C2 5 .
36. Philip Boroff & Scott Silvestri, Bank America, Fleet Reach Record $675 Min Fund Pact,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. I5, 2004.
37. Masters, supra note 32, at EI.
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Congress weighed in, holding hearings throughout the fall. Public
hearings were held before Senate and House subcommittees charged
with oversight of the industry's regulators.
SEC Chairman William Donaldson, appearing before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, testified that "the
industry has lost sight of certain fundamental privileges," and promised a
vigorous regulatory response." He expressed shock at the widespread
nature of the abuses, and began by noting that "we all... have spent
much time lately wondering how the current abuses could have
happened."39 The commission should not have been so surprised.
II. MARKET TIMING MUTUAL FUNDS: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE SEC's PRICING RULES
The problems associated with mutual fund pricing have been present
since the development of mutual funds themselves, and the SEC has
been grappling with rules to curtail the problems almost since the
inception of the industry.
The first mutual fund was launched in 1924-The Massachusetts
Investors Trust-followed three months later by Incorporated Investors,
later named the Putnam Investors Fund.4" From their early years, funds
struggled with the dual mandates of allowing investors to redeem their
shares on demand, and pricing the shares held in the fund based on their
current fair value. The problem with this dual mandate was that it often
created a situation where short-term traders could take advantage of the
ability to buy or sell mutual fund shares on demand because prices the
mutual fund used did not accurately reflect the current value of the
underlying shares. For example, mutual funds initially calculated the
NAV of their shares at 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, but did not apply
them to transactions made until after io:oo a.m. the following morning.
4
'
A sophisticated trader could purchase fund shares early the following
day, and as long as they made the purchase before io:OO a.m., would buy
at the day-old prices, profiting because they could see the change in the
price of the shares the mutual fund held because those shares had
already begun trading at 9:oo a.m. eastern standard time.42
38. Recent Developments In Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, io8th Cong. 32-39 (2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. S.E.C.)
[hereinafter Donaldson Statement].
39. Id.
40. See Conrad S. Ciccotello et al., Trading at Stale Prices With Modern Technology: Policy
Options for Mutual Funds in the Internet Age, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, § II.A (2002).
41. Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 250.
42. Id.
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I. The 194o Investment Company Act and the Problem of
"Backward Pricing"
The 1940 Investment Company Act was the first major effort by the
SEC to craft a body of regulations governing the mutual fund industry. It
was in some ways a reaction to the dilution of long-term shareholders'
profits, and it eliminated many of the most blatant abuses of mutual fund
pricing at the time. 3 However, even after passage of the 194o Act,
mutual funds still used a methodology known as "backward pricing," that
allowed speculative traders to profit from large market swings." Under
the backward pricing formula, the price of a fund share was set based on
the last posted NAV. This policy allowed traders to watch for shares that
were rising or falling that day, purchase mutual funds that held those
shares but whose price was calculated based on the share price before it
had moved, then sell the following day once the mutual funds' NAV had
been updated with the changed price. '5
2. A Solution To Backward Pricing: SEC Adopts Forward Pricing
Rule
In 1968 the SEC adopted Rule 22c-I, an addition to the Investment
Company Act of 1940, in an effort to end the abuses it saw from
backward pricing. The new rules required mutual funds to set their
prices at the end of each trading day, and, under the new rules, shares
purchased that day would be priced based on the value of the shares at
the end of the day. This so-called "forward pricing" model was designed
to eliminate the market timing the SEC believed was rampant and that
was harming long-term shareholders.47 Short-term traders could no
longer buy mutual fund shares whose prices were based on the "stale
prices" of underlying shares.
Rule 22c-I did not fully correct the problem, however. As the
number of mutual funds that offered investors the chance to invest in
overseas markets grew, a new type of "backward pricing" abuses began
to emerge, one that was possible because mutual funds were increasingly
investing in stocks that traded in markets outside the United States.
Section 2(a)(4) of the 1940 Investment Company Act requires funds
to price thinly-traded shares based on their "current market value,"
43. See Ciccotello, supra note 40, § II.B (Before passage of the 194o act, mutual funds would
calculate their NAV at 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time but not publish it until io:oo a.m. the following
morning. In the interim, mutual fund insiders and favored clients who knew the unpublished price
could profit by trading with shareholders who were unaware of the unpublished price in what can be
deemed a "riskless arbitrage.").
44. Id. § II.C.
45- Id.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22C-I(a) (2004).
47. Barry P. Barbash, Remembering the Past: Mutual Funds and the Lessons of the Wonder
Years, Remarks at the 1997 ICI Securities Law Procedures Conference 5 (Dec. 4, 1997), transcript
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/spchI99.txt.
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which the Commission describes as the share's last quoted share price on
a national exchange. If a share does not have a readily available market
price, as is the case for shares of thinly-traded companies, mutual funds
are required to determine a "fair value" for the shares as determined in
good faith by the fund's board of directors."5 However, this rule did not
generally apply to shares of stock that traded in Europe and Asia-
mutual funds could instead use the price of those stocks when they had
closed hours earlier. As later abuses would demonstrate, the SEC's
efforts fell far short of curtailing the abuses.
B. THE EMERGENCE OF FAIR VALUE PRICING
The use of fair value pricing got little attention at the SEC until
i98i, when two Putnam mutual funds petitioned the Commission for
permission to adopt a fair value pricing methodology it had developed.49
The subsequent no-action letter from the SEC (an interpretive decision
often sought by those regulated by the Commission to ensure their
practices comply with its rules) said Putnam could use financial
algorithms and methodologies to estimate the fair value price of its
international mutual funds on days when dramatic market moves during
United States market hours (either general market moves of such a
significant nature that they would be expected to impact Asian markets
overall, or even just dramatic price moves in industries or market
segments that would be expected to be repeated for shares in the same
sector in Asia) made the closing prices of Asian equities no longer
reflective of their current market price." While the SEC first addressed
the issue of fair value pricing in its 1981 response to Putnam, it did little
more than to simply allow mutual funds to voluntarily adopt fair value
pricing.5 There were no requirements at the time that mutual funds adopt
any sort of fair pricing regime for shares that trade in Europe or Asia; the
guidelines stated that funds were not prohibited from using the earlier
closing prices of shares on foreign exchanges, even on days when
extraordinary events might leave those prices "stale" and warrant
calculating different prices at the end of U.S. trading hours. 2
The Commission only began addressing the issue of fair value
48. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(I) (2004) ("Portfolio securities with respect to which market
quotations are readily available shall be valued at current market value, and other securities and assets
shall be valued at fair value as determined in good faith by the board of directors of the registered
company.").
49. See Putnam Growth Fund, S.E.C. No-Action Letter, i98i SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3088 (Feb. 23,
1981).
50. Id. See also Barbash, supra note 47, at 6.
5t. See Barbash, supra note 47, at 6.
52. See id. ("Under the staff's 1981 position, a fund may (but is not required to) price portfolio
securities traded on a foreign exchange using fair value, rather than the closing prices of the securities
on the exchange, when an event occurs after the close of the exchange that is likely to have changed
the value of the securities.").
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pricing in a substantive way following the 1997 Asian economic crisis,
which created repeated opportunities for market timing mutual funds
that held shares of Asian equities.53 The problem reached a peak on
October 28, 1997, when markets in Hong Kong dropped 14%, followed
by a rally in New York later that day. Apparently, the dramatic price
swings were being exploited by short-term traders who were rapidly
buying and selling mutual fund shares to exploit the fact that mutual
funds did not update their prices during U.S. market hours, despite
events that would cause dramatic moves in Asian markets later that
night." A few funds, Fidelity Investments in particular, had responded to
the rapid trading of its shares by adopting fair value pricing to update the
price of shares held in their Asian equity mutual funds to reflect the
expected rise on the Hong Kong and other Asian exchanges later that
day as a reaction to the rise of markets in New York. Traders who had
been attempting to market time the fund challenged Fidelity's actions,
and a subsequent SEC investigation cleared the mutual fund company of
any impropriety.5
C. THE SEC's "SIGNIFICANT EVENTS" TEST
The mutual fund trading abuses that occurred during the Asian
economic crisis led the SEC to embark on a comprehensive study of how
mutual funds calculate their prices, and whether the lack of the use of
fair pricing methodologies harmed long-term shareholders. After a year
of review, the SEC announced its policy in a letter from Douglas Scheidt,
the associate director and chief counsel of the Division of Investment
Management to the Investment Company Institute's (ICI) general
counsel, Craig Tyle. 6 The 1999 Scheidt letter reiterated the SEC's
position that funds should generally rely on market price quotations
when they are readily available, and when accurate market prices are not
readily available, the SEC suggested that funds use fair value pricing
methods in calculating their NAV.57 Specifically, the SEC suggested that
funds should use fair value pricing on days when the foreign markets on
which the shares it held were traded were closed, and that mutual fund
boards had an obligation to adopt fair value pricing methodologies for
those shares.5 This letter did not clarify the questions within the industry
about when mutual funds might be required to adopt fair value pricing,
and what type of methods the funds might use when seeking to
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7; see also Ciccotello, supra note 40, § II.D.
55. See Ciccotello, supra note 40, § II.D.
56. Letter from Douglas Scheidt, Associate Director and Chief Counsel, S.E.C., to Craig Tyle,
General Counsel, Investment Company Institute (Dec. 8, 1999), at http://www.sec.gov/divisionsl
investment/guidance/tyle 12o899.htm [hereinafter 1999 Letter from Douglas Scheidt].
57. Id.
58. Id.
[Vol. 56:585
PROTECTING MUTUAL FUNDS
implement a fair value pricing methodology. Two years later the SEC
sought to clarify these issues.
In an effort to establish better guidelines, the SEC drafted a follow-
up letter to the ICI in December 2001 addressing when mutual funds
would be required to adopt fair value pricing methodologies. 9
Specifically, the SEC said that when so-called "significant events" had
occurred that the closing price of a security traded in an overseas market
would no longer be considered a "readily available" price, and in those
instances funds were required to use a fair pricing methodology to
produce an accurate market price for those foreign securities it held."
The letter, however, gave no explicit definition of what would constitute
a "significant event" that would require the fund to use fair value pricing,
though it did mention events such as a natural disaster or an armed
conflict.6' The letter stated that "significant fluctuations in domestic or
foreign markets may constitute a significant event.'' 62 The letter
suggested that "[w]hether a particular event is a significant event
depends on whether the event will affect the value of a fund's portfolio
securities."' The SEC said that there was a "good faith" onus on a fund's
board of directors to insure that the value of its securities accurately
reflected their current market price at the time.64 In hindsight it appears
that this reliance on the good faith efforts of mutual fund boards was
misplaced.
III. MARKET TIMING ABUSES INCREASE
A. STUDIES DEMONSTRATE LOSSES TO SHAREHOLDERS
Beginning in the late 199os, academics began to document the
widespread nature of market timing mutual funds, the costs to long-term
investors, and why the current SEC rules were ineffectual in curtailing
the abuses. The findings indicated that, despite SEC guidance to the
mutual fund industry, market timing strategies remained profitable, with
higher-than-average potential profits available with lower risks than
would be associated with a buy-and-hold investment strategy.6, Some
studies further demonstrated that these excess profits were coming at the
59. Letter from Douglas Scheidt, Associate Director and Chief Counsel, S.E.C., to Craig Tyle,
General Counsel, Investment Company Institute (Apr. 30, 2001), at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment/guidance/tyleo43ooi.htm [hereinafter 2001 Letter from Douglas Scheidt].
6o. Id.
6. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 256-58; see also William Goetzmann et al., Day Trading
International Mutual Funds: Evidence and Policy Solutions, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 287,
306--o8 (2ooi).
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expense of long-term shareholders. 66 Funds were forced to honor
redemptions from short-term traders reaping profits that should have
been spread out among long-term shareholders, and to adopt policies-
such as keeping more of a fund's investments in cash to meet increased
redemptions of shares-that further reduced the profits of long term
shareholders.
7
In one of the leading articles in the field, Eric Zitzewitz, an associate
professor at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, attempted to
quantify the potential profits available to short-term market timing
traders, and the costs these trading strategies exacted on long-term
shareholders. Zitzewitz's article should have given mutual fund
executives and regulators great pause.
Zitzewitz gathered pricing data from i1,556 mutual funds and
calculated the number of potential arbitrage opportunities based on price
changes in United States' markets after European or Asian markets had
closed (primarily looking at price changes in United States markets after
I1:3o a.m. eastern standard time when European markets closed).68
Zitzewitz calculated potential opportunities for sophisticated traders to
market time mutual funds, then compared the potential profits from
those opportunities to a strategy of buy and hold investing. Based on an
analysis of trading and pricing data from January 1998 until October
2002, Zitzewitz calculated that short-term traders reaped $4.9 billion in
excess profits a year from market timing activities, with $4.3 billion of
this profit coming from international mutual funds. 9 Zitzewitz calculates
that investors in regionally-focused international equity funds saw their
annual returns sliced by 1.6% a year, while general international equity
funds saw profits shrink by o.8i% a year.7' Even more troubling, a
comparison of academic studies suggests that the number of instances of
market timing of mutual funds was on the rise as more traders became
aware of the potential for outsize profits. One earlier study estimated
that investors were only losing about $i.i billion a year in 1998, leading
to a general conclusion that market timing abuses grew four-fold from
1998 to 2002."1
Zitzewitz's article concluded by questioning why market timing has
become so prevalent. After discussing the potential legal and logistical
problems with adopting methods to prevent market timing, Zitzewitz
offered another explanation. "Another possibility, which one would
66. Goetzmann, supra note 65.
67. See Complaint 1 i9-2o, State v. Canary Capital Partners, L.L.C. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (No.
402830/03).
68. Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 251-52.
69. Id. at 26o.
70. Id.
71. See Goetzmann, supra note 65, at 309.
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hesitate to even suggest until all others are exhausted, is that fund
management company employees directly benefit from allowing
arbitrage."7 It turned out to be a stunningly prescient observation.
B. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
Even as academics were pointing out the widespread nature of
market timing abuses within the mutual fund industry, many were also
suggesting solutions that could begin to address the problem. Among the
leading suggestions were, (I) the imposition of higher short-term trading
fees and (2) the regular and consistent use of fair pricing methodologies
for mutual funds holding international equities or shares of U.S. stocks
that are thinly-traded and are therefore at risk of valuing those securities
at "stale prices," leaving them vulnerable to market timers.73
It is possible to estimate a "fair value" for shares of stock that do not
trade often, or shares that last traded hours earlier on Asian or European
markets. Currently there are financial products that trade in the United
States that can provide relatively accurate predictions of the opening
prices of those shares in home markets in Asia, Europe or Latin
America.74 United States exchanges, including the New York Stock
Exchange, the NASDAQ, and the American Stock Exchange, all now
trade a variety of derivative securities whose values are designed to
imitate the values of stocks, bonds or stock indexes outside the United
States, while many individual stocks of the largest non-U.S. companies
have shares that trade in the United States. Known as ADRs (American
Depositary Receipts), these derivative securities allow investors to buy
and sell an equivalent to the shares of foreign-based and foreign-listed
stocks by buying an ADR that is traded on U.S. exchanges during U.S.
trading hours and is expected to mimic the price of the original share as
traded in Asia or Europe. 5
The proponents of fair pricing acknowledge that no one derivative
security or other proxy could accurately reflect the change in prices for
all of the international securities held by mutual funds. What many
academics were suggesting, however, is that mutual fund boards could
adopt a strategy that priced shares based on the cumulative data
gathered from a variety of sources, and that a methodology could be put
in place that would allow the fund to gather this data and extrapolate a
72. Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 279.
73. See Ciccotello, supra note 40, §§ II.C, III.B.I-.2; Goetzmann, supra note 65, at 288-90;
Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 269 (Zitzewitz and Ciccotello both discuss fair value pricing funds and the
imposition of trading fees, while Goetzmann focuses solely on the adoption of fair value pricing
methodologies.).
74. See Marcelle Arak, Trading Japan From Chicago: Equity Trading Techniques, FuruRES, Jan.
I, 2002, at 34.
75. See, e.g., NYSE, in Luring Latin Shares, Overtakes London in Listings Race, BLOOMaERG
NEWS, May 25, 1995.
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price change that could be applied to all the shares in the fund. 76 At least
two companies currently offer fair pricing services for mutual funds.77
Many of the academic studies conclude that fair value pricing, if
done consistently, could eliminate most of the market timing abuses in
mutual funds holding international equities traded in Europe or Asia.
Zitzewitz estimates that adopting regular fair value pricing strategies will
substantially reduce market timing activities for two reasons. First, the
prices of the funds will more accurately reflect current prices.
Second, the use of fair value pricing inserts unpredictability in the
pricing of mutual fund shares that make it difficult if not impossible for
market timers to accurately capture any inefficiencies that existed in the
old pricing methodology, even on days when the fair value pricing is not
a ioo% accurate calculation of the expected move in the underlying
shares.78 Professor Zitzewitz reported that one mutual fund pricing
services methodology removes more than 95% of NAV predictability,
meaning that in nineteen out of twenty cases it would prevent a trader
from correctly capitalizing on "stale prices."'79 Other academics, including
William Goetzmann, Zoran Ivkovic and Geert Rouwenhorst, reached a
similar conclusion, calculating that funds that use ADRs, futures
contracts and derivatives to fair value price securities on a daily basis
eliminate the profitability of market timing those mutual funds.Y°
Nevertheless, the results are strikingly different when fair value
pricing is utilized in more limited circumstances, such as under the
"significant events" test proposed by the SEC in the 2001 Scheidt letter.
Zitzewitz analyzes the use of fair value pricing whenever the fair value of
the shares in a mutual fund are expected to vary by at least 1.5% from
the "stale" closing price of those shares hours earlier, a market move he
8,describes as a "significant event" under the SEC rules. Under these
circumstances, Zitzewitz estimates that on average, market timing
traders' profits would only be reduced by io%. 2 Additionally, Zitzewitz
points out that fair value pricing on days with significant market events
requires the input of high level executives, a time-consuming and costly
endeavor that many funds would presumably be reluctant to undertake
very often.83 An earlier analysis of when funds would conduct fair value
pricing determined that it occurred significantly less often on Friday
afternoons, when the efforts to do so were presumably higher.84
76. See 1999 Letter From Douglas Scheidt, supra note 56, at 2-3.
77. Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 272.
78. Id.
79. Id.
8o. Goetzmann, supra note 66, at 305.
8i. Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 270.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Professors Conrad Ciccotello, Roger Edelen, Jason Greene and
Charles Hodges also attempted to quantify the savings that mutual funds
would see from fair value pricing on significant events days only. They
found that a mutual fund that adopted fair value pricing methodologies
on the days with the one percent largest movement in the S&P 5oo index
(about two or three days a year) would reduce market timers' profits
from 34.65% returns to 32.5%.85 Even if the funds used fair pricing
methodologies on the top 20% of all market-moving days (about once a
week), Ciccotello et al. conclude that the market timers' profits would
only be reduced to 23.5% a year." They write that "empirical evidence
suggests that stale price traders have formed a systematic effort that is
not tied only to big events but to daily trading, to bleed funds a little at a
time.
, ,
Further, the studies conclude that the current SEC rules were not
effective in forcing mutual funds to develop and consistently use fair
value pricing methodologies -even on the limited times when there had
been a significant market event. Zitzewitz's analysis of funds' NAVs has
found that it is unlikely that the "vast majority" of international mutual
funds have used fair value pricing even once during the period of May
2001 to September 2002, a period that was noted for its volatility and
price swings. 8s Even the SEC now concludes that most funds do not use
fair value pricing. A survey of 960 mutual funds found that one-third of
the funds had not once used fair value pricing during the past twenty
months, and have said they had only used fair value pricing five times or
less during the same period. s9
IV. THE SEC's RESPONSE TO THE CURRENT CRISIS
A. RULES TO DISCOURAGE MARKET TIMING
The SEC promised a vigorous response to the current crisis, and in
many ways has delivered. The Commission has brought dozens of
enforcement actions against rogue mutual funds, heightened corporate
governance and director independence rules, and passed new regulations
requiring increased disclosure by mutual funds in its reports to the SEC.9'
From a governance and ethics standpoint, the Commission staff has
strengthened the compliance and disclosure requirements for mutual
funds, required funds to adopt a code of ethics, ordered an increase the
number of independent board members to 75% of a fund's board, and
granted fund boards the power to hire an independent staff and counsel
85. Ciccotello, supra note 4o, § IV.A.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 273.
89. S.E.C.: Many Funds Don't Use Fair Value Pricing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, at C4.
90. See Donaldson Statement, supra note 38.
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that would report directly to the board.9
i. SEC's Fair Value Pricing Rules
The SEC has also specifically addressed the issue of market timing in
new regulations. However, the new rules only reiterate the rule requiring
funds to use fair pricing methodologies on days when a significant event
would make the prices of the international equities it held stale. They
would, however, strengthen the disclosure by mutual funds of the policies
and practices it has in place to detect and deter market timing.
Specifically, the SEC requires that mutual funds disclose in their offering
documents or prospectuses the policies the funds have adopted towards
market timing, and how their procedures insure compliance with its
market-timing policies.93 Additionally, the new rules reiterate that mutual
fund directors, particularly the independent directors not employed
directly by the mutual fund, have a fiduciary obligation to monitor the
funds to insure that they are complying with SEC regulations and the
funds' stated policies in regard to market timing.' Finally, the SEC
would require that mutual funds fair value price their securities "under
certain circumstances" to prevent the type of market-timing abuses that
have come to light.9' Nevertheless, this requirement remains voluntary.
In a response to the SEC's initial proposal, the Investment Company
Institute ("ICI"), the mutual fund trade association, pointed out that the
fund need only include an explanation of the circumstances that the fund
would use fair value pricing. Implicit in these rules is that mutual funds
will use fair value pricing in certain circumstances; what is left unsaid is
what those circumstances might be and how the mutual funds would
determine when those triggers had been reached. The ICI's response to
the SEC implicitly acknowledges this; it urges that the Commission not
require that funds "must identify every circumstance that might require it
to fair value securities in its portfolio."' SEC Chairman Donaldson on
the other hand has described the reforms as "substantial and far
reaching" and designed to alter the way in which the fund industry is
91. See REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS FORUM, BEST PRACTICES AND PRACTICAL
GUIDANCE FOR MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS 5-10 (July 2004); Press Release, SEC Proposes New
Investment Company Governance Requirements, New Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics
Requirements, and New Confirmation and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements (Jan. 14, 2004), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2o04-5.htm.
92. See Disclosures Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 69
Fed. Reg. 22,300 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 274).
93. Id.
94- Id.
95. Id.
96. Letter From Craig Tyle, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, S.E.C. 4 (Feb. 5, 2004), at http://www.ici.org/statements/cmltr/2oo4/o4_sec mkt-
timing-com.html.
97. Id.
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regulated over the long term. 98
2. The Proposed 2 % Redemption Fee
In addition to the above-mentioned governance and fair value
pricing rules, the SEC considered a separate measure to curtail market
timing abuses -requiring funds to charge a mandatory 2% redemption
fee for any shareholder who purchases mutual fund shares and then
holds them less than five days."9 The Commission described the policy as
aimed at "reducing or eliminating the ability of shareholders who
frequently trade their shares to profit at the expense of their fellow
shareholders."
But the proposal drew significant industry opposition. One study, by
the Boston-based Tower Group, estimates that it would cost the mutual
fund industry more than $3 billion over three years to implement.' °' The
SEC has backed away from this proposal, saying now that it will only be
a "voluntary" measure funds can implement if they see fit."°2
B. WHY THE SEC's MARKET TIMING RULES FALL SHORT
The current spate of new regulations, coupled with increased
enforcement and monitoring efforts by the SEC as well as criminal and
civil indictments brought by Eliot Spitzer and other state regulators, will
likely curb many of the current abuses. The rules requiring increased
independence of mutual fund boards, better oversight by mutual fund
board directors, an independent staff, or a requirement that the industry
develop heightened ethics standards will all lead to a better functioning
mutual fund industry.
However, the fair value pricing rules the SEC has proposed still
leave many mutual funds vulnerable to market timers, and thus
susceptible to continued losses that must be borne by individual
shareholders. The current SEC rules on fair value pricing emphasize that
mutual funds need to adjust the prices they use in calculating their
closing share prices only when significant events have occurred between
the time the shares last traded on an exchange and when the mutual
funds are calculating their NAVs, the same position the Commission
took in its 1999 and 2001 letters to the Investment Company Institute.
3
The theory is that absent significant market-moving events, the
98. Donaldson Statement, supra note 38.
99. See Mandatory Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762 (Mar.
5, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270) [hereinafter Mandatory Redemption Fees].
too. Id. at 11,764.
ioi. Ken Hoover, Fund Reforms Come With High Costs; Study Questions Worth, INVESTORS Bus.
DAILY, Aug. 18, 2004, at A7.
102. John Spence, Donaldson Outlines Upcoming SEC Fund Reforms, CBS MarketWatch, Mar. 9,
2005.
103. See 2001 Letter from Douglas Scheidt, supra note 59, at 3; 1999 Letter from Douglas Scheidt,
supra note 56, at 2.
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difference in share prices from when those shares last traded and when
they will trade later are too small for traders to exploit profitably. The
academic analysis of this type of trading casts much doubt on that
assumption; indeed, recent studies concluded that even if mutual funds
were fair value pricing as often as once a week, market timing arbitragers
could still collect returns more than 23 % a year above returns they would
normally receive."
V. A PARTIAL SOLUTION
A. EXPAND THE FORWARD PRICING RULE
In its proposal suggesting a rule requiring a 2% redemption fee, the
SEC also requested comments on additional ways it could alter or
expand the fair pricing rules to discourage market timing." The
Commission then asked for comments on the following proposal:
Should the Commission require that funds determine the value of
purchase and redemption orders at the net asset value calculated the
next day after it receives those orders, rather than at the time that the
fund next calculate its NAV? Under such an approach, market timers
would not be able to predict whether the next day's NAV would be
higher or lower, and, therefore, would not be able to trade profitably.
On the other hand, such an approach would diminish ordinary
investors' ability to promptly effect their mutual fund investment
decisions.'"
So far the Commission has not given a strong indication it will adopt
such a proposal. But as this Note argues, it should.
Congress and the SEC have twice before been faced with
widespread abuses in the mutual fund industry where sophisticated
investors, often aided by complicit mutual fund managers, have exploited
pricing inefficiencies in the mutual fund industry to extract extra profits
from long-term investors.'" In both 194o and 1968, Congress and the
SEC leveled the playing field for individual investors by requiring that
fund shares that are bought or sold are priced based on the nearest
available future price.' In 1940, the SEC required that funds set their
NAVs once a day (at 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time generally) and that
any trade after that time is calculated at the next closing day's price". In
1968, the SEC forced the industry to adopt a forward pricing rule so that
the price of shares bought are calculated at the closing price later that
day."' Therein lies one partial solution to the current crisis.
to4- See supra Part III.
Io 5 . See Mandatory Redemption Fees, supra note 99, at 1,767.
io6. Id. at 11,768.
1o7. See supra Part II.
so8. See supra Part II.
to9. See supra Part II.
iio. See supra Part II.
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The SEC should give mutual funds that trade international securities
a choice. They could use fair value pricing on a consistent basis. Or, they
could adopt policies that would forward price their shares. Under this
proposal, the time at which a mutual fund shareholder bought or sold his
shares would determine at what time his price was set. In each instance,
the price would be set based on the subsequent closing prices of the
stocks it held in the markets where those underlying shares are primarily
traded.
For example, under the current rules, a mutual fund shareholder in
the United States who bought shares of a fund that held stocks that
traded in Japan would have the price of his shares calculated at 4:00 p.m.
eastern standard time using the prices of Japanese equities when they last
traded fourteen hours earlier in Tokyo. Under this proposal, that
calculation would be delayed until 2:oo a.m. eastern standard time, when
markets in Japan had closed-preventing an arbitrager from buying (or
selling) shares during U.S. trading hours knowing that markets would
rise (or fall) in Japan later, and thereby getting the benefit of "stale"
prices at the expense of other shareholders. Under this proposal, the
mutual fund share value would be calculated using forward pricing, that
is, based on prices after the Japanese market had next closed. Any effect
a United States-based event had on Japanese shares would be reflected
in market trading of those shares-and in the price that was used to
calculate the value of the mutual fund shares in the United States.
Similarly, if an investor bought or sold shares of a mutual fund that
held shares in European companies during United States market trading
hours (after European markets had closed, generally at II:3O a.m.
eastern standard time), those sales or purchases would not be priced until
the following day, after European markets had again traded.
The equation gets slightly more complicated if mutual funds hold
shares of stock that trade in Asia, Europe and the United States, but
nonetheless, the principle remains the same. Once an investor buys or
sells a share, it is not priced until each of the markets in which the funds
have shares have traded and closed. So an investor who purchased shares
of a mutual fund with U.S., European and Japanese equities would have
his shares priced after each market had closed following his purchase. So
for example, if a U.S. shareholder purchased shares or a mutual fund
between 9:oo a.m. eastern standard time and I 1:3O, that purchase would
be priced at 2:oo a.m., after the European, United States and Asian
markets had subsequently closed. Similarly, if this same shareholder
purchased his shares between 11:31 a.m. eastern standard time and 4:00
p.m. eastern standard time, that purchase price would be calculated at
11:3o a.m. the following day, after the United States, Asian, and then
European markets had closed.
In each of these cases, the price would be able to be accurately
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calculated within twenty-four hours. More importantly, this process
would eliminate the ability of market timers to take advantage of stale
prices because none of the prices would be stale. Regardless of the time
the shares were bought or sold, the underlying security would have been
traded on an open market after the buy or sell but before they were
priced. This is the natural evolution of the SEC's forward pricing rules,
applied in a modem context where shares trade in all -time zones.
This proposal could act as a cost-effective alternative to the current
efforts to force mutual funds to fair value their shares. As the academic
literature (and empirical evidence from the current crisis) indicates,
many mutual funds that hold international equities do not fair price their
shares under any circumstances."' A definitive explanation for this lack
of fair pricing is not readily apparent. Nevertheless, the cost (both in
straight dollars as well as in manpower hours of senior executives and
directors) of developing and implementing fair pricing methodologies is
substantial and points out a reason why many mutual funds resist
voluntary fair pricing requests. In urging funds to only use fair value
pricing on days when there have been significant market events, the SEC
has implicitly acknowledged the costs and difficulties of accurately
calculating the fair values for myriad instruments on a daily basis.
Further, this solution bypasses the problems of "fair pricing" shares
of myriad instruments traded in differing markets. Fair value pricing
often requires estimates based on indicators in the United States that
may misinterpret what might be expected to happen once those shares
actually trade in their home market. For example, ADRs are available
for hundreds of companies, but not nearly every company in which a
mutual fund would buy a security. Additionally, market indexes are
broad gauges of markets, not completely accurate indicators of how
much an individual stock or bond will move in price in reaction to a
significant event hours earlier. For example, if there was a terrorist attack
against the United States, shares of most companies would be expected
to track the market indices and fall. Shares of defense contractors, or
security companies, however, might move in the opposite direction,
depending on investor sentiment of the fallout from the attack.
The current solutions to these problems only provide rough
estimates of what shares may do once they begin trading later. A
proposal that bases pricing on the trading in the shares after it occurs will
always be accurate.
B. LIMITATIONS TO THE FORWARD PRICING PROPOSALS
This proposal is not a panacea for all that ails the mutual fund
industry. Given the repeated cases of improper self-dealing by mutual
I. See, e.g., Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 273; see also Complaint 23, State v. Canary Capital
Partners, L.L.C. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (No. 402830/03).
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fund managers and lax oversight or outright complicity by fund boards,
no solution will completely deter improper -practices without honest
managers and an independent board to ensure compliance. The SEC is
correct to press for reforms in mutual fund corporate governance and
oversight.
Further, while fair value pricing international funds will address the
majority of market-timing instances; it does not address the problems of
market timing in mutual funds that hold thinly-traded U.S. equities."2
Thinly-traded equities are shares in companies that do not trade on a
daily basis; in some instances days go by between trades. In those
instances, it would be impractical to force a mutual fund to wait days or
even weeks to price the shares in the mutual fund. Further, as at least
one study notes (Goetzmann, 2001), forward pricing becomes
increasingly complex and expensive for the small class of mutual funds
that hold shares that trade in multiple international markets."'3
Critics may also argue that this proposal creates a slight delay for
investors in receiving a confirmation price for the mutual fund shares
they bought or sold. To an extent they are correct, but that criticism
overstates the demands of mutual fund shareholders as weighed against
the benefits of forward pricing. Additionally, in almost every instance,
the price difference in adopting this proposal will be so slight as to be
unnoticeable by most investors, particularly long-term investors who
aren't measuring profits in small daily price change increments. Mutual
funds are designed for long-term shareholders, whose interests are little
harmed by a several hour delay in receiving a price for their purchase or
sale. Most shareholders who buy and sell shares of mutual funds cannot
be expected under most current brokerage rules from being able to
withdraw their funds without some delay (usually a day or two). Even
trades on national exchanges such as the NYSE and Nasdaq take up to
three days to "clear" or become final. And weighed against the
advantages, the delay becomes even less pressing. Mutual fund
shareholders saw their profits reduced by about $4.9 billion a year from
unscrupulous market-timing activities by rapacious professional traders
and investors. Any solution that eliminates or at least dramatically
reduces those losses would be rightly welcomed by the average mutual
fund investor.
CONCLUSION
The mutual fund industry faces its greatest crisis in confidence since
its inception. The SEC is facing criticism for failing to detect the
112. See Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 26o (noting that of the estimated $4.9 billion in losses in
mutual fund shareholder profits from market timers in 2001, an estimated $4.3 billion of that comes
from international equity funds).
1 3 113. Goetzmann, supra note 65, at 305.
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problems plaguing the mutual fund industry, as well as earlier problems
at companies such as Enron and WorldCom. But with the crisis comes an
opportunity -both for regulators to establish new rules that benefit
average investors instead of professional traders, and for the mutual fund
industry to adopt the best practices that will restore confidence in their
industry and lure back average investors who make up the bulk of
mutual fund investors and are the ones leaving the industry in record
numbers.
This proposal is simple to implement, is fair to the funds and to the
investors, and would completely eliminate the ability of traders to exploit
"stale prices" in international mutual funds to reap gains at the expense
of average investors.
